




COUNTER-TERRORISM IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA 2004-2010: 








On the 11th of July 2010; as funs watched the FIFA World Cup Finals around the world, 
two separate suicide bombings rocked Kampala, Uganda leading to the deaths of 79 
people and injuring many others. Al-Shabaab, a fundamentalist group in Somalia 
immediately claimed responsibility. These events sparked widespread debate within 
scholarly circles as far as the counter-terrorism agenda in the Greater Horn of Africa is 
concerned. 
 
In recent years, terrorism has grown to become a vice of global magnitude. The Greater 
Horn of Africa has had its own share of terror attacks and terrorism-related activities 
since the late 1990s. The resilient anarchy in Somalia seems to have worsened the 
picture. Six years after the formation of the Transitional Federal Government in October 
2004, Somalia is yet to have a fully operational government. This state of affairs, coupled 
with similar regional challenges made the Greater Horn an easy target for global crime 
syndicates- piracy, drugs and light weapons trafficking and most notably, international 
terrorism. Since late 2006, Somalia seems to be the epicentre of Islamic fundamentalism 
of the kind witnessed in the Middle-East in recent years. The countries in the region more 
often than not, are unable to tame the vice as they were plagued by internal challenges- 
active and/or potential conflicts amongst them. 
 
It is against this background that this paper sought to explore the challenges facing the 
counter terrorism agenda in the Horn of Africa with a view to assessing the evolving 
terrorism threat with specific reference to Somalia and further charting the way forward 
on the same. The researcher arrived at the conclusion that; international terrorist activities 
are not a preserve of any single country. It has both short and long-term effect on almost 
any country. The structural features on which terrorism thrives; particularly poverty, 
ignorance, bad governance, disorder and insecurity all need to be addressed not only as 
“the Somali problem” but one that involves all state and non-state actors in the Greater 
Horn of Africa. This calls for concerted economic, political and security cooperation now 
and in future. 
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Introduction 
On the 11th of July 2010; as funs watched the FIFA World Cup Finals around the world; 
two separate suicide bombings rocked Kampala, Uganda leading to the deaths of 79 
people and injuring many others. Al-Shabab, a fundamentalist group in Somalia 
immediately claimed responsibility. These events sparked widespread debate within 
scholarly circles as far as the counter-terrorism agenda in the Greater Horn of Africa is 
concerned. At the centre of it is the resilient anarchy in Somalia- the Somalia Question. 
(Onyango-Obbo, 2010:20). In an interdependent world, terrorism is borderless. 
Technology and efficient communication systems along with global commerce, have 
indeed, changed the face of terrorism in Africa in particular, and the world in general. 
The modern-day style of terrorism invites a new definition of the phenomenon. Such a 
definition must therefore include the two faces of terrorism; it must acknowledge the 
terror perpetuated by states as well as the violence of transnational and national groups 
(Onwudiwe 2006:4).  
 
According to Georges-Abeyei and Hass (1982:1-7); the goal of terrorism is to terrorize. 
Regarding their objectives, terrorist acts are atrocious and create confusion among the 
general public (Colliers J. 2003: 91-103). The Greater Horn of Africa has had its share of 
the atrocities and implications of global terror. The region was shocked by the dual 
bombings of American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam Tanzania that 
claimed over 250 lives in 1998. It also witnessed the bombings of the “USS Cole in 
Aden, Yemen in 2000, and the bombing of the Israeli owned Paradise Hotel in Malindi, 
Kenya in 2002.  Terrorism experts have noted that the events in Africa epitomise the 
view that attacks on the United States and other targets did not occur in isolation; they all 
demonstrate the global nature of terrorism (White 2006). 
 
The community of world states has over this period (1998 to present) continued to take 
active and decisive measures to combat the vice in what has evolved to become ‘global 
war on terror’. But as time went by, international terrorist movements equally made 
efforts in order to counter and/or avoid any legal and military action directed towards 
them (Knonenwetter 2004:vi-ix). This state of affairs therefore continues to make counter 
terrorism a complex and indeed, a very dynamic realm. What is certain about it is that; it 
can only materialize through joint action and purpose-driven cooperation among 
countries.  
 
Despite the absence of a significant terrorist attack in the Greater Horn region over the 
past few years, terrorist movements remained active in the region. At the same time, 
Somalia continues to be an epicentre of anarchy right in the heart of the region. The 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was formed in Nairobi, Kenya (following 
the IGAD-driven Somalia National Reconciliation Conference) in October 2004, was not 
able to establish its authority over the war torn country (Albert Walkers 2005:10-16).  
In mid 2006, insurgents backed by the Islamic Courts Union overpowered forces loyal to 
the TFG and captured Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. (The East African 2006: 19). It took 
the intervention of Ethiopian forces to stem the growing popularity of the Union of 
Islamic Courts (ICU) and the eminent overthrow of the TFG government in December 
2006. But the Ethiopian intervention could only cure the symptoms and not the disease; 
 165
the ICU had already “done the harm” (The Daily Nation: 2007:14). It is against this 
background that the United States of America stepped up its counter-terrorism operations 
in the Eastern Africa region, particularly the Horn. Indeed, twice in January 2007, a U.S 
warplane launched offensive attacks on suspected Al Qaeda bases in Somalia (Daily 
Nation 2007:1).  
 
From then on, Somalia continued to witness a series of suicide bombings- reminiscent of 
the Iraq situation -with the latest series of such attacks targeting the Somali president, 
Abdullahi Ahmed Yusuf, his then Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi, African Union 
Peacekeepers and any other form of resistance to the ICU course, especially Ethiopian 
forces in Somalia, whom they deemed to be American backed. 
 
At the political and military-security/strategic levels; these developments clearly sent 
serous signals to the defence and national security formations in the Greater Horn of 
Africa and beyond. Against this background, this article re-examines the evolving 
terrorist threat in the region with specific reference to Somalia. This is in view of better 
informing the counter-terrorism agenda in the Greater Horn of Africa region.  
 
The Evolving Terrorist Threat in the Greater Horn of Africa 
The region in focus here comprises of the following countries: Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Djibouti. It is noteworthy that though Somalia 
seems to be at the epicentre of the terrorism debate, it is not the monopoly of terrorist 
activity. The term “terrorism” has no precise or widely accepted definition. The problem 
of defining terrorism is compounded by the fact that terrorism has often been applied to a 
variety of acts of violence, which are not strictly terrorism by definition. Some definitions 
focus on the terrorist organization’s mode of operation while others emphasize the 
motivations and characteristics of terrorism. Thus, a universally acceptable definition of 
terrorism is difficult to have, for one man’s terrorist will always be another’s freedom 
fighter. The United Nations describes terrorism as criminal acts intended or calculated to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons. 
Such acts may be invoked by political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic or 
religious considerations (UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60, December 1995).  
 
Nonetheless, certain events in the Eastern Africa region in recent years were nothing 
short of terrorist atrocities. The war in Western Darfur, attacks on civilians in Northern 
Uganda, the Mungiki and Sabaoti Land Defence Force (SLDF), the Turbi Massacre and 
the January 2008 Post-Election Violence in Kenya did exhibit what would pass to be 
terrorist activity.  Three major factors can be identified in an account of the growing 
terrorist activity in these countries. These factors include: 
 
Proximity to and historic linkages with terrorist hubs and other precipitant processes 
These historical linkages are two fold: Those that stem from the people’s cultural history 
on one hand, and those associated with their contemporary socio-political experience. On 
the latter for instance, it can be claimed that terrorism in the region originates from 
revolutionary pressures at home, regional battles, economic conflicts and regime tyranny. 
This is largely true particularly with Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia where several 
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aspects of conflict have led to armed insurgency and outbreaks of terrorism at lest of the 
domestic nature (Martha Glenshaw: 1994). In April 26th 2002, for example, guerrillas 
from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) swept down on a funeral in the Southern Sudan. 
Sixty mourners are gunned down after reportedly being forced to cut up and eat the 
corpse that was being buried (Michael Kronenwetter: 2004: 211). 
 
On the other hand, cultural factors and proximity to terrorist hubs around the globe 
(especially the Middle East) offer even more vivid explanations to the growing terrorism 
threat in the Greater Horn of Africa region (West D.L.: 2005). The problem not being 
Islam as such; the heavy presence of Muslim populations in these countries provides a 
safe haven for extremists to hide. The percentages of Muslim population in the region are 
as follows: Djibouti (94%), Eritrea (50%), Ethiopia (50%), Somalia (100%), Sudan 
(70%), Tanzania (35%), Uganda (16%) and Kenya (10%). In this light, it is noteworthy 
that at least three suspects of the failed London bombings in 2005 were born in East 
Africa (Tom Downey’s: 2006:18-23). 
 
Similarly, proximity of the Comoros Island and Yemen is a factor to reckon with. Yemen 
is separated from Djibouti and the rest of the Greater Horn by a relatively brief sea front 
to the East of the Gulf of Aden. Most wanted Al-Qaeda militants have used Yemen either 
as a training base or as a transit point before launching attacks in the Greater Horn region 
(Tom Downey’s: 2006:18-23). 
 
Weak Security Infrastructure Characterized by Porous and un-policed Borders  
A couple of governments in the Greater Horn of Africa tend to be preoccupied with their 
internal political survival to the effect that terrorist operatives easily penetrate the 
countries involved. Faced with various belligerent movements from within –and coupled 
with poor economic performance and poor weak technological infrastructure- such 
regimes are weakened and thus make it easy for international terrorist organizations to 
develop linkages with domestic cells and/or criminal groups and further exploit 
traditional networks of money transfer and remittances to further their goals. In the 
process, they manage to melt into needy populations in refugee camps and among asylum 
seekers. This way, depressed economies and unstable states provide hideouts for 
terrorists to thrive in. When countries have poor security infrastructure, it simply implies 
that international terrorist groups will easily penetrate their territories unchecked 
(Schwartz S.: 2003).  In January 2007 alone for instance, Kenya’s Anti-Terrorist Police 
Unit (ATPU) rounded up 11 suspected terrorists as they attempted to enter the country 
from Somalia (Daily Nation: 2007:5). 
 
Resilient Anarchy in Somalia and the Regional Dynamics of Terrorism  
In the past few years, the International Community has renewed its interest in Somalia 
because of the threat of terrorism from extremist Islamic groups; Al-Qaeda itself or 
others using the environment of the Somali collapsed state as a safe haven to operate with 
impunity. Such terrorism has been a threat in Somalia for over a decade and remains so 
today. Nevertheless, the continued lack of international political engagement has 
permitted an already unstable situation to deteriorate thereby creating potential for more 
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violence and lawlessness of the sort that can offer terrorists greater opportunities 
(International Crisis Group African Report No. 45:1994).  
 
Overtones of State Sponsored Terrorism in the Greater Horn 
Regional politics and security concerns continue to play themselves out -often violently- 
within Somalia. Regional tensions have often been essentially complicated by political 
cleavages inside the country and the tendency of regional powers to use local militias to 
advance their goals. While it is tempting to portray some of these tensions as “a clash of 
civilizations” between a highland, Christian Ethiopian leadership and a lowland, Muslim 
bloc that combines Somalis, Arabs and other ethnic groups, reality is more complex. In 
essence, Somalia’s relationship with Ethiopia is very uneven with some areas reviling 
their neighbour and others looking to it for support. The roles of the Arab states may be 
diverse, while those of Djibouti, Kenya, and Eritrea do not fit easily into an Ethiopian-
Arab dispute. The ill-defined but burgeoning role of Islamic non-state actors has 
increasingly become important (International Crisis Group Africa Report: 2004:8).  
 
Whenever Ethiopia sneezes in the Greater Horn of Africa the region catches a cold. Its 
location in the Horn is strategic. Yet, it is land-locked and its long and complicated 
border has been a flashpoint for conflict on many occasions (Muthama: 2007:19)  In late 
2006, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zinawi maintained that Ethiopia was 
“technically” at war with Somalia’s Islamists because they had declared Jihad on his 
nation. In mid-December 2006, Ethiopian troops were already inside Somalia waging war 
against the Somalia Islamic Courts Union. After a week of artillery and mortar duels 
between the two sides, the situation had spiralled into an open war. By the end of 
December, forces loyal to the TFG had gained control of towns held by the ICU, thanks 
to the Ethiopian intervention (Daily Nation: 2006:16).  To the Islamic Courts Union 
leaders, this was a conflict against a Christian-led Ethiopia; a holy war against 
“Crusaders” while Ethiopia and her allies portrayed it as a war against Al-Qaeda linked 
terrorists.   
 
The derailed Ethiopia-Eritrea peace process is a key factor fuelling the war situation 
inside Somalia. The two countries have taken sides in the conflict with Ethiopia backing 
the TFG on one hand and Eritrea supporting the ICU. In the real sense, both countries are 
using the war as a proxy to settle their own political scores; yet this in itself can pass to 
be state sponsored terrorism especially on the part of Eritrea and Ethiopia. According to 
the former US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer “The Council of 
Islamic Courts is now controlled by East Africa Al-Qaeda cell individuals. The top layer 
of the Courts is extremist to the core and they are in control; and that is the problem” 
(Terrence Lyons: 2006:7). Addis Ababa on its part worries that a hostile government in 
Mogadishu would strongly support the Oromo National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the 
United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF) and revive earlier goals of 
encouraging the Somali inhabited areas of Ethiopia to join it. 
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Although a member of the Arab League, Djibouti’s policy is the product of sometimes-
contradictory elements. Ethnic and historical ties1 in Ethiopia place Djibouti under a 
special obligation to show leadership on Somali affairs. Another major consideration for 
Djibouti is its symbiotic commercial relationship with Ethiopia. Economic dependence 
on transit trade obliges it to maintain a working relationship with its southern neighbour. 
On the other hand, Ethiopia’s almost exclusive dependence on Djibouti’s port since 
closure of the Eritrean port, Assab, places it under a similar obligation (International 
Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 45, 2004:7). 
 
When the Islamic Courts Union took over in mid 2006, Djibouti did not take a clear-cut 
position on what side to support. Nonetheless, a report released by the US Department of 
State in late 2006 claimed that Djibouti not only acknowledged having provided the TFG 
with 3000 military uniforms but also formally received a senior Islamic Courts delegation 
in September 2006. It must be remembered too that Djibouti is predominantly a Muslim 
state. In this light, it has tended to treat the Somali problem as a Muslim and/or Arab 
affair. It is for this reason that Djibouti strongly supported the Arab League mediation 
talks held in Khartoum in 2007, with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the battle for 
political control in Somalia, between the TFG and the ICU. 
 
In early 2009, the mandate of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) ended and 
President Abdullahi Ahmed Yusuf left office. This saw the rise to power of Sheikh 
Sharrif Ahmed as President with Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as Prime Minister. 
Although Sheikh Sharrif was himself a former prominent member of the Union of 
Islamic Courts, his rise to power seemed not to auger well with the Islamist groups 
fighting for control of Modagishu, Somalia’s capital. The US among many other 
countries including the European Union, IGAD and the African Union seemed to approve 
of President Sharif’s leadership. The US particularly regards him to be a moderate who 
can quell extremism and restore order in the war torn country. Yet despite these 
developments, typical terror attacks continued to take place inside Somalia. 
 
The fall of the Union of Islamic Courts and the Rise of Al-Shabaab in Somalia: A 
Critical Analysis of the Terrorist Connection 
Following the formation of the TFG in Nairobi in late 2004, President Abdullahi Yusuf 
Ahmed and his allies, under pressure from Kenya the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) states to relocate to Somalia set up a provisional capital in Jowhar 
on the grounds that Mogadishu was insecure. Two assassination attempts on Prime 
Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi while visiting the old capital city did at least confirm the 
TFG’s fears. Nonetheless, key figures in Yusuf’s government led by Hassan Adan (the 
speaker of Parliament) preferred to have Mogadishu as the capital (The East African, 
November 22-28, 2004:4). They finally settled on Baidoa, a neutral town 250 kilometers 
northwest of Mogadishu. All this while, Mogadishu and its environs was in the hands of 
warlords who had formed strongholds around the ruined city following more than a 
decade of anarchy. Meanwhile, another force sprung to power, the ICU (The Islamic 
                                                 
1Djibouti’s population is roughly half Somali and its head of State, President Ismail Omar Guelle, is an 
ethnic Somali born. 
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Courts Union) in June 2006. The ICU captured Mogadishu from the warlords who had 
already formed an alliance -the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism 
(ARPCT). 
 
The rise of the ICU marked the emergence of militant Islamism as a major ideology that 
cut across traditional social divisions and challenged traditional modes of dispute 
resolution by ascending to some degree above the clan structure. The Islamic Courts 
began a decade ago as a local clan-based mechanism for dealing with chronic lawlessness 
in Mogadishu (Crisis Group Africa Report No. 116, 2006:16-17). It was valued by locals 
and business interests as one of the few sources of governance in the south that brought a 
degree of peace and security unknown to the troubled country. For a long time under its 
reign, Mogadishu was reunited, militia checkpoints were torn down, weapons were 
removed from the streets and the international port and airport reopened for business. By 
December 2006, the courts had expanded from their Mogadishu base to control most of 
southern Somalia, before they were rooted out by Ethiopian and TFG forces.   
 
The Muslim Brotherhood -a worldwide Islamic movement that started in 1828 and which 
gave birth to several religious and political organizations in the Middle East is said to 
have been introduced to Somalia in mid 19th century by local scholars returning from 
Egypt and most Islamic Courts members in Somalia subscribe to it (Meir 2003). But 
within this setting there are several ideological extremes: on one hand are the “Salafiyya” 
a largely apolitical outfit that, however, promotes literal interpretation of the Koran; 
while on the other hand are the more radical ones who prescribe to “Salafi Jihadism” a 
brand of Wahabism- One such group is the Al-Ittihaad Al-Islaamia (AIAI).  
  
In the mid 1990s, this group waged a guerrilla assault against Ethiopia, ostensibly to unite 
all Somali-speaking people to their ancestors -Somali irredentism (John Mbaria, 
2007:14). The most prominent member of this group within the Union of Islamic Courts 
(ICU) is the famous Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Another such leader is Adan Hashi 
Aryo who is a militia commander of one of the courts. He is considered an extremist 
Muslim and was trained in Afghanistan. He came to the fore following the recent attacks 
that involved the desecration of Italian cemeteries in Mogadishu and was blamed for 
killing five western aid workers and BBC journalist Kate Peyton in 2005. He is largely 
viewed as a newcomer on the Somali scene, being mentored by Aweys. Finally, there is 
Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, who is the Executive Head of the UIC. Upon the ICU’s control of 
Mogadishu in mid 2006, Sheikh Sharif’s assurance to the International community that 
the ICU is against terrorism reinforced his moderate position. He maintained that the ICU 
takeover was a popular revolution that sought to enable the Somali people choose their 
country’s destiny and a response to anarchy and plunder by the warlords (Cedric Bernes 
and Harun Hassan 2007:12-14).  The other key ICU leader is Sheikh Hassan Hersi “Al-
Turki” who is formally a leader of Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI). Since 2004, Hassan Al-
Turki was designated under US presidential Executive Order 132224 for terrorist 
financing. He is controversial in that he is a former warlord who occupied the lower 
Shabelle in 2003 but later allied himself the Islamic Courts (The Economist, January 4, 
2003). 
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Since its formation in late 2004, the Transitional Federal Government was unable to 
establish control over Somalia. Right from the beginning, it was faced by opposition from 
two fronts: an associated group of militia led by warlords on one hand and several groups 
of Muslim leaders who held Islamist and/or antiwestern views as far as the future of the 
country was concerned. Many incidences continued to send the signal that all was not 
well in Somalia. In February 2005, a bomb blast killed two people and wounded six 
others in a visit by African Union (AU) experts who had been on a fact-finding exercise 
aimed at preparing Somalia for an AU peacekeeping mission  (The Standard, February 
18, 2005:19). Earlier in November 2004, President Abdullahi Ahmed Yusuf was attacked 
at his Nairobi residence; an incident that raised fears that the warring factions in the 
lawless state were extending their rivalry in Kenya (The East African, 22-28 November, 
2004:1).    
 
In May 2006, the leader of a self-proclaimed counter-terrorism alliance warned that the 
Somali government had been infiltrated by extremists who were Al-Qaeda sympathisers. 
Mohammed Omar Habre alias Mohammed Dhere was the leader of the Alliance for the 
Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism. On its part, the Union of Islamic Courts 
(ICU) accused the warlords of being the ‘real terrorists’ who “deserved to be tried for war 
crimes… but instead were accorded safe haven,” and enjoyed US backing (Daily Nation 
May 21, 2006). 
   
Since the December 2006 triumph of the TFG (backed by Ethiopian forces) over the ICU, 
a new wave of typical terror attacks have characterized the ICU course. In late 2006, two 
suicide bombings were reported in Baidoa where the government was stationed at the 
time. The insurgents adapted Middle East style suicide bombings. At least one person 
blew himself on April 19, 2007 near an Ethiopian military compound. At least two 
Ethiopian vehicles entering the compound were destroyed to small pieces. On April 24, a 
suicide bomber attacked an Ethiopian forces compound in Afgoye town, 30km south of 
Mogadishu. There were no immediate casualty reports. On April 25, 11 people were 
killed in a suicide attack on a major hotel around KM4 roundabout, south of Mogadishu 
where the Somali government officials are based. On June 3, a truck bomb exploded 
outside the residence of the Somali interim Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi. At least 
six people were killed and 10 injured - most of them bodyguards. A militant Islamic 
group claimed responsibility for suicide bombings; vowing to continue attacks until 
“occupiers” left Somalia (The East African June 12-18, 2006: 19). 
 
The group who called themselves the Mujahideen Youth Movement said in an Internet 
statement “…our brave brother Abdul-Aziz Mohammad Senter carried out a heroic 
martyrdom operation at the resident of the apostate Prime Minister. Your brethren at the 
Mujahideen youth Movement are pressing on with their holy fight against all occupiers 
and apostates.” (The Daily Nation, June 5 2007:18). At the same time, Ethiopian forces 
managed to thwart yet another suicide bomb attack when they shot dead a would-be 
suicide bomber; blowing up his vehicle which was filled up with explosives as it raced 
towards their command headquarters in the Somali capital Mogadishu. Members of the 
ousted Islamic Courts openly declared and vowed to wage an “Iraq-style” insurgency. In 
this direction, they tossed grenades into crowds and civilian targets and were behind the 
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killing of a Somali journalist Mahad Ahmed Eluno who was perceived to be “western” 
oriented. In March 2008, the United States launched another air raid over the town of 
Dobley claiming that the attack was against a well known Al Qaeda terrorist. The strange 
thing was that following the attacks, hundreds of Somalis staged protests saying they did 
not approve any American activity because the Americans were against their religion and 
culture (Daily Nation March, 5th 2008). 
 
According to Salim Lone, “Islamists are now fully part of the mainstream in all Muslim 
societies. Their parties have established a powerful presence in a growing number of 
countries, including Sudan, Iran, Palestine, Pakistan, Somalia and Egypt.” Salim Lone 
(2007:11).  The message being sent here by Salim Lone; and with the current conduct and 
disposition of insurgency on the part of ICU components inside Somalia; coupled with its 
regional ramifications, connections, and implications -one thing is for sure; circles of 
international fundamentalist terror groups have finally gained influence and 
operationalization in the Greater Horn of Africa region. True enough, on September 17th 
2009, Al-Shabaab insurgents detonated two suicide bombs at the African Union peace 
keeps’ headquarters in Mogadishu, killing nine on the spot. The death toll following this 
attack later rose to 21. The insurgents were avenging the killing of the Kenyan born Saleh 
Ali Saleh Nabhan by US Special Forces a week earlier. Washington had reported Saleh 
was on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s list of Most Wanted due to his alleged 
Master Plan role in the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa.  
 
Meanwhile, the United States claimed that Ahmed Al Fazul, a most wanted terror suspect 
may have been killed in the attack. Fazul is believed to be a key mastermind for the 1998 
terrorist attacks on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and subsequent ones in 
2002 in Mombasa However, Kenyan security agencies believe that Fazul is alive and is 
part of Al-Shabaab’s top command. Fazul remains the most wanted man on the Kenya 
Police website. The Rewards For Justice Program of the United States Department of 
State is offering a reward of up to 5million Dollars for information leading directly to the 
apprehension or conviction of Fazul (Daily Nation, 9th March 2010). During 2009 and 
early 2010, suicide bombings were rife in and around Mogadishu, Somalia’s war-battered 
capital. Since June 2009, five Somali ministers have been killed by suicide bombers. 
These attacks show that Al Shabaab is a formidable destabilizing factor to the present 
government (Hassan and Malkadir, August 2010). 
 
Yet while Washington maintains that Al-Shabaab is al Qaeda’s proxy in Somalia, the 
leader of the Union of Islamic Courts Sheikh Dahir Haweys called for more attacks until 
all foreigners left Somalia. It seemed that Al-Shabaab activity was confined to Somalia in 
its move to oust the Government of Sheikh Sharrif Ahmed through conventional or 
unconventional warfare- whichever met their goals best. It need not have been surprising 
when Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the Kampala 11th July terror attacks. This 
now meant that international terrorism in the region was alive and fully operational; with 
its epicentre being Somalia. But the great question here is: Why Uganda? It appeared that 
Uganda’s active involvement in the African Union Military Operation in Somalia 
(AMISOM) was the main reason for the terror onslaught on Kampala. But why should 
Kampala suffer for its role in a peacekeeping force that is supposedly “African?” Perhaps 
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the authenticity and clout of the entire operation is wanting. Indeed, the resilience of 
anarchy in Somalia was at the centre of debate during the African Union (AU) Summit 
held in Kampala on 5th-8th of July 2010. Although the African Heads of State strongly 
condemned that Kampala terror attacks, they seemed unable to provide a final and lasting 
solution to the ‘Somalia Question’ (Voice of America, July 2010).  
 
Future Counter-terrorism Efforts in the Greater Horn of Africa: Lessons for IGAD 
and AU 
There are two basic approaches in any counter terrorism strategy: one that seeks to abate 
and/or ameliorate situations of structural conflict thereby acting to pacify populations and 
divert their attention from terrorist ideology and activity; and the one (and most easily 
preferred) that involves coercive methods -military action and legal punitive measures.  
Yet the threat of terrorism in the region and other parts of the world is ever growing, ever 
manifest. Perhaps it is crucial to examine key actors in the region and the issues involved 
as far as counter terrorism is concerned.  
 
The Intergovernmental Authority of Development (IGAD) was instrumental in the peace-
making processes that saw the end of civil wars in Sudan and Somalia. The Nairobi 
Somalia National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) was under the IGAD mandate. 
Naturally therefore, IGAD (at least in principle) has tended to support the TFG, which it 
helped form. In June 2006 IGAD regional ministers ratified a Kenya-led travel ban on 
Somali warlords. The ministers who met under the chairmanship of Kenya’s Foreign 
Affairs Minister Raphael Tuju agreed to work with the International Community to 
isolate the warlords by freezing their accounts throughout the world.  The East African 
(August 7-13, 2006:8). 
 
Nonetheless, the ministers extended amnesty to warlords who might have previously 
been involved in atrocities against the Somali people but were ready to surrender and 
work with the TFG. In the same light, in March 2006, IGAD mandated Ethiopia and 
Uganda to deploy a peacekeeping force in Somalia. It was further resolved that the UN 
arms embargo remains but with exceptions to allow the TFG to maintain law and order. 
Also IGAD cautioned the international community against offering any form of support 
to any parts in Somalia without consulting it and the TFG. Finally, they called upon the 
USA to stop any unilateral and parallel initiatives on Somalia.  
 
Yet in August 2006, IGAD was confronted with a number of issues that put her in a 
rather compromised situation. During an extraordinary meeting of IGAD Foreign Affairs 
Ministers in Nairobi, IGAD warned particularly Ethiopia and Eritrea from taking 
unilateral actions that undermine the powerless but internationally recognized TFG. The 
East African (August 7-13, 2006:8).In the same vain, it seemed as though IGAD was not 
able to meet these desired objectives. The US had already taken sides and was supporting 
warlord factions against Islamic militias. It was claimed that these warlord operations 
were run from a CIA station in Nairobi. The Daily Nation (January 12, 2007:11). Other 
IGAD member states seemed to be divided over who to support and who not to protect in 
Somalia.  
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Peacekeeping for Somalia was meant to support the TFG (now defunct) and stop any 
resurgence into full-scale war. On March 1st 2007, President Museveni of Uganda flagged 
off a 1600-strong peacekeeping contingent under the AU mandate. The Ugandans are the 
only ones in the country and the Ethiopian forces who are “simply there to support the 
TFG” (The East African, June 11-17, 2007:6). Despite spirited efforts by the African 
Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) through its 
then chair, Kenya’s President Mwai Kibaki, enthusiasm for the initiative has been 
lukewarm. Mr. Kibaki, whose term as IGAD Chair was extended for one year in 2007, 
sent as many as eight cabinet ministers on a major diplomatic offensive to drum up 
support for the Somali peacekeeping efforts. The Kenyan emissaries were sent to 
Rwanda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Tunisia and Algeria. Out of these, 
only Uganda has responded with an offer of troops2. Most recently, Uganda’s Security 
Minister Amama Mbabazi revealed that Kampala had decided to establish direct contact 
with militia and insurgents not only to pre-empt further attacks on Ugandan troops, but to 
re-emphasize the country’s role as a neutral player in the conflicts. 
 
From the foregoing, there can be identified three major areas that should better inform the 
counterterrorism agenda in the Greater Horn of Africa region. First; is there a well co-
ordinated counter terrorism strategy so far? It goes without saying that terrorism and 
counter-terrorism needs a re-definition as far as the Greater Horn of Africa region is 
concerned. Although the EAC countries seem to be well connected and organized in their 
counter-terrorism efforts; a good number of their IGAD counterparts are not reading from 
the same script. From this discussion, it is clear that to countries such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Sudan and Djibouti, there is no consensus on who the terrorist are, especially with respect 
to the political divide inside Somalia. In the larger picture, there wasn’t agreement on 
whether to go the non-coercive (mediation, negotiation, reconciliation) or coercive way.  
The TFG in Somalia was unable to operate well because the IGAD countries, which were 
instrumental in its formation, have not worked together to support it.  As at now, only 
Uganda has deployed troops in the AU mission in Somalia. The TFG has had a raw deal 
from fellow members as far as IGAD is concerned. On the military action, there has not 
been a clear and well-coordinated approach. From the onset Ethiopia’s intervention in 
Somalia was unprocedural since it lacked either IGAD or AU backing; the result of 
which is a stalemate situation of the Iraq kind in the past several months. 
  
Second; what has been done to deal with Structural Conflict situations in the Greater 
Horn Region? Certain underlying circumstances political, economic and socio-cultural 
breed conflict situations. In this light, poverty, disaffection and hopelessness do not 
directly cause terrorism, but provide an environment in which terrorists can be recruited 
and terrorism can thrive. This is what is happening in Somalia and parts of Sudan, 
Ethiopia and Uganda. The Somalia case is particularly worrying since there seems not to 
be a clear “way forward” on how these problems can be addressed. The problems facing 
Somalia are immense. For instance, a good percentage of young people in Somalia were 
born and brought up after 1991 (West 2005). They don’t know any other way of life but 
war. Today, the future of conflict management efforts in the Horn of Africa remains 
                                                 
2 (From interviews with officials at Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
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uncertain in almost all cases with the exception of Southern Sudan3. Darfur, Northern 
Uganda, Eastern Ethiopia, Eritrea-Ethiopia tensions among others all remain as moribund 
issues that could explode to affect the region rather adversely.  
 
Thirdly; what has been achieved through Intelligence Cooperation? The modern digital 
environment has made terrorism and other transnational crimes vastly easier to 
coordinate on a worldwide scale. It has also exacerbated a very serious challenge: 
governments attempting to stop terrorists-particularly democracies – are expected to do 
so without undermining the laws, representative principles and informal confidences 
upon which a culture of democracy depends on (Jennifer Sims (2007:39-56). 
 
What makes terrorists particularly difficult intelligence targets for traditional systems is 
that they organize networks, insinuate themselves into open societies, and kill suddenly. 
Whereas traditional collectors were designed to penetrate governments located in state 
capitals or military deployments located in discrete battlefields, terrorists specialize in 
operating in small numbers and under the skins of their adversaries that is, wherever they 
can do the most harm. They fashion themselves to look like their targets and burrow into 
society to lie in wait. In this sense, they occupy the moral space as assassins, but without 
the assassin’s traditional limits on targeting. Deceit is part of terrorists’ stock-in-trade and 
innocents are their intentional victims. Their offensive operations are also crucial to their 
defense; by instilling fear and panic, terrorists create sufficient confusion to enable their 
swift escape. As far as intelligence for counter-terrorism is concerned the Greater Horn of 
Africa countries seem not to have realized that to fight a network of Al-Qaeda cells in the 
region; a network of intelligence is essential. On several occasions since 2004, 
intelligence and defense chiefs from the region met in Khartoum and Nairobi towards this 
aim. However, there is need to implement the plans in a better way.   
 
Conclusion and the Way Forward     
A new resilient form of fundamentalism seems to have caught countries of the Greater 
Horn of Africa unawares. Fully operational terror cells are indeed at work inside Somalia, 
Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and most recently, Uganda. The IGAD group of countries is 
squarely to blame since their approach to the Somali problem in particular was aberrantly 
inconsistent and disorganized especially since the formation of the TFG in late 2005. For 
this reason state sponsored terrorism cannot be overruled especially on the part of 
countries (in the region and beyond) using Somalia as a proxy for settling old scores. For 
there reasons, there is need to re-engineer the current counter terrorism strategy in the 
region. It is recommended that: 
 
All the countries in the Greater Horn of Africa must congregate on this matter and work 
towards a common anti-terrorism policy. If there is one, then it needs to be well 
coordinated and operational.  
Governments in the region should work towards strengthening governance and 
governmental capabilities, building and maintaining infrastructure, creating jobs, 
                                                 
3 It is noteworthy that the Sudan is set hold a national referendum following the end of the six-year 
transitional period stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005. Sudan post-
conflict peace building seems promising so far.    
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providing education and attempting to support local efforts to ensure the rule of law in 
countries in the region. 
  
In this light, it is crucial to reach out to Islamic communities in the region and work 
towards creating an atmosphere of harmony and equity between Islamic and non-Islamic 
populations in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Tanzania and Kenya; where there have been 
misconceptions and disagreements on mitigation and apprehension of terror suspects.       
IGAD must work towards resolving the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict that has manifested 
itself in Somalia rivalries. This will ease the tension and give way for a truly conclusive 
counter-terrorism strategy for the region.  
 
Stemming from the above action, the African Union and IGAD states should find a 
lasting solution to the Somalia problem. Somalia is indeed the epicentre of terrorist 
activity for obvious reasons- the resilient anarchy in the country. Perhaps a military 
solution is not the best way forward. There is need for a clear and decisive approach, 
which is directed towards creating a harmony of interests. Towards this end, a Hybrid 
AU-UN Peace Keeping Force is perhaps the best way forward.  
 
There is urgent need for coordinated intelligence analysis and policy making capabilities 
in the region. In this vein, counter-terrorism strategies must be well connected among the 
countries’ security machinery. This would be with the view of strengthening counter-
terrorism capabilities and encouraging trans-regional cooperation.   
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